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Critical Thoughts on a Fabulous Experience and Its Heritage 
Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont 
Invited to comment on the legacy of Jean Piaget’s ideas in my own work, I will first turn back 
to the genesis (a Piagetian habit, I suppose!) of my contacts with him, to the reasons why I 
chose to study in his institute and to the socio-cognitive experience of entering psychological 
research from a Piagetian perspective (of course, not only Piagetian, as I have also had the 
chance to study with other very different researchers, among them Basil Bernstein in London 
and Willem Doise in Geneva). I will then choose more specifically a few of Piaget’s ideas 
that weave throughout my own work. 
On the steps of the university, I was hesitating between psychology and education, 
teaching mathematics or philosophy, going into social or youth work, not daring to imagine 
myself as a researcher. My father, a physicist, then gave me some very good advice: choose 
an expert rather than a discipline and observe him working. This is how I came to Piaget, 
known for his important empirical work in the social sciences—and I have not been 
disappointed. Being a student of Piaget was a breathtaking experience from the beginning: his 
sphere of knowledge was so extensive that it became immediately clear to me why his large 
audience at the university was made up of students that were studying with him as long as 
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four consecutive years. It took indeed quite some time to be introduced into the complex 
questions that Piaget was raising and to gain a minimal familiarity with the scientific world 
that was the arena of his thoughts. I also ventured beyond the walls of his institute into other 
faculties of the University of Geneva. This additional experience helped me not only to put 
into perspective the originality of Piaget’s contributions but also to renounce any ambition of 
full mastery of any of the questions raised. Complexity, models, intellectual traditions, 
changes—they all became keywords. 
Knowledge is fascinating. Piaget had knowledge as his main object of study (and not 
the child—which was quite a surprise to me). I felt deep relief when I understood that 
knowledge could be better described as a process (i.e., knowledge-in-the-making) than as a 
state of the art. This was perhaps my main Piagetian “finding” during my studies. Of course, I 
should not say “finding,” I should say “learning”—a better term, because I cannot claim for 
myself such a finding. But Piaget made a very important point: he legitimized the idea that a 
student, even a child, is in fact “finding out” for himself1 everything he learns. The experience 
of “discovery” (in its various forms—insight, sudden understanding, etc.) is at the root of 
Piaget’s description of cognitive development. He sees it as the basic and fundamentally 
motivating intellectual and emotional experience. It was also what I was experiencing and 
enjoying, although not uncritically. 
I was wondering if children—and we students—were likely to find out things that 
would diverge fundamentally from what Piaget and his intellectual forebears or opponents 
had already “found out.” I hoped so because I did not want to depart from the idea that there 
is social space for the new generations to be creative. But was the creativity of the individuals 
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not becoming lost if the main opus of their development was considered by Piaget to be the 
reconstruction for themselves of concepts that others had already developed? I had the 
strange, insecure feeling that I was trapped in some variety of ego-socio-centrism: not the 
egocentrism that Piaget had attributed to the child, nor the socio-centrism that he had 
discussed, but a form of adult-centrism in which the kind of adult that Piaget is would be the 
norm (Piaget-centrism). Indeed, why would the auto-equilibration process necessarily lead to 
those (formal) modes of thinking that Piaget had experienced and described as the last stage 
of development? Should every normal person end up thinking like him? What could the 
alternative criteria be for the acknowledgment of a cognitive advancement? Why were 
children of Iran (Mohseni, 1966), Morocco (Bovet, 1974) and other distant places (Dasen, 
1972) reported to have delayed development in the acquisition of operatory concepts? Were 
we not socio-centric in considering that this time lag was due to a “less facilitative” 
environment? 
<H2>Is Formal Thinking Always the Unique and the Best Endpoint?</H2> 
Reflecting on school visits in the classes of progressive education teachers, I was wondering 
why would students’ inquiry learning be expected to make them necessarily “discover” the 
concepts presently used in the sciences. Of course, modes of reasoning and established 
scientific knowledge are available in children’s environments, somehow already there to be 
“rediscovered” by them. But why would individual creativity end up reinventing necessarily, 
via the reequilibration of cognitive conflicts, the existing scientific (and supposedly so 
“logical”) world? Nor, in my eyes, could social determinism explain why the personal 
involvement of an I “in search of meaning”2 would necessarily be satisfied by the type of 
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knowledge described by Piaget and like-minded scientists? We also had some distant echoes 
of Smedslund’s criticisms that helped us in becoming aware that Piaget’s “logical operations” 
were constraining explanation of behavior to some kind of logical reductionism (Smedslund, 
1966, 1992). 
Reading the few texts of Vygotsky that were available in those days did not solve the 
problem: why would children appropriate the expert’s knowledge? The idea that the learning 
of formal knowledge was the result of adults joining in the child’s zone of proximal 
development and introducing proper semiotic tools was quite a contrast with Piaget’s views. 
It opened up new perspectives, particularly in understanding the social origin of internalizing 
processes in the child. But why would the line of “development” be equated with this 
“learning of formal knowledge?” Why would development end up necessarily in the present 
state of the experts’ knowledge? We were not certain that this was really what Vygotsky and 
Russian psychology had been saying, but it was difficult for us, in those days, to check. 
Later, Hundeide (1991, 2005), with his discussion of the meaning of specific 
schooling and teaching practices in specific contexts, would comfort me in my doubts about 
the line of development being usefully equated with (or reduced to) the development of 
abstract thinking. 
<H2>Social Interactions in Real Life and in Theory</H2> 
In the meantime, I was really becoming interested in the pseudodialogues between mothers 
and babies described by Schaffer (1977): he shows that the protoconversation itself is 
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coconstructed, and the partners are interdependent. The distant echoes of Bruner’s ongoing 
work on language acquisition and the role of social formats mediating, structuring, even 
engendering adult–child conversations, narrated by researchers from Oxford, intrigued me as 
well. We later read them (Bruner, 1983). 
Were all these conversations and asymmetrical interactions between expert and 
novice, including Piaget’s clinical interviews, sophisticated imitative exercises or truly open 
conversations? They had to be both, certainly. It was not easy to discuss these questions 
openly. Piaget was busy building his theory. He was not granting much free space to his 
students and research assistants. Reciprocity (in spite of being such an important concept in 
Piaget’s model) was not at the core of the system of social relationships that Piaget was 
developing around him. In 1968, when students asked him why, I remember him answering 
by proudly showing a letter: “Why are you not happy to contribute to my work (mon oeuvre)? 
Is this not sufficient? Plenty of students abroad would envy you. See the letter that the 
Americans have just sent me: they are even founding a Jean Piaget Society!” A climate of 
scientific “orthodoxy” prevailed at the institute, which proved successful in having research 
efforts converge. It was sometimes emotionally painful and intellectually confining for those 
that did not fully agree. Yet Geneva was a fascinating place, attracting scholars from all over 
the world. Some would stay; some felt too critical to stay. But students and young researchers 
learned to grasp the ideas that circulated in the corridors and the cafeteria. 
A delicate point of the “orthodoxy” was the relation to education. The Institute Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, which had gradually become a school and then a faculty of psychology 
and educational sciences, was founded by Edouard Claparède, who wanted to root progressive 
5
education in empirical research and to offer the possibility for teachers in training to attend 
university and learn about educational research. Piaget had been called to Geneva by Edouard 
Claparède and Pierre Bovet to contribute to this project (Oelkers, 2008). He did so, notably, 
as director of the International Bureau of Education. His writings from this period are 
collected in several books on education. But Piaget never did empirically study education, per 
se. He reminded me of his cocitizen, the Neuchâtelois writer Denis de Rougemont3 (1929), 
who also had very definite ideas about education, strongly criticizing school education, 
sometimes rightly, but sometimes with arguments that could cast some doubts on the 
understanding of the complex social challenges that schools were facing. Were both these 
authors forgetting that not all families provide their children with the same learning 
opportunities as those that these gentlemen had experienced in their families and cultural 
environments (Perret-Clermont and Barrelet, 2008)? Were they claiming that the specific 
stimulating experiences that had positively sustained them at home should also be provided 
by schools and therefore should be implemented in teacher training and curriculum? Yet 
Piaget never did personally investigate possible alternatives to the ongoing traditional 
teaching. He was so critical of his school education and its formal teaching that he was not far 
from thinking that schooling disturbed children’s spontaneous learning processes: “Children 
should not be taught answers to questions that they have not asked.” 
Of course, to some extent, this is right: too often students learn statements without 
understanding to which questions they are the answers; they retain information with no idea 
of their possible use; the meaning of what they learn, to them or to society, gets lost. On the 
other hand, why would children ask questions about things that they have not even heard of? 
Jean Brun, Jean-Paul Bronckart, and several others of us wanted to address these educational 
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questions seriously, and we moved from the department of psychology to educational 
sciences in order to conduct research on those activities that have specific and explicit 
teaching–learning purposes (didactics). This was supported by the energetic reshaping of the 
department of educational sciences that Michael Huberman was promoting. Unfortunately, it 
contributed to an unintended divide between psychology—henceforth discharged of the 
responsibility of systematically caring about education as a major cultural and institutional 
component of children’s lives (a rupture with Claparède, Bovet, and their collaborators’ initial 
project)—and education (to some extent left to the domination of adults’ perspectives, such as 
those of teachers, administrators, or politicians), as the child’s perspective, usually voiced by 
Piaget and other psychologists, tended to be left behind. 
This was a great disappointment to me, but it oriented me toward a new project: 
moving to Neuchâtel and founding a new institute of psychology and education at the 
University of Neuchâtel, where research could develop around more or less “forbidden” or 
“taboo” elements of the Piagetian research scene. These would include taking explicitly into 
account the sociocultural constraints and supports of the child’s (but also young adults’ and 
adults’) growing “minds” and an understanding of these as emerging personalities, nested in 
social activities, in quest of life skills as well as of identities. Special attention would be paid 
not only to cognitive learning but also to meaning construction and the relevance of 
educational activities for the learners, without forgetting that learning also occurs in settings 
that have not been designed as learning settings: therapeutic settings, workplaces, peer 
groups, and on other informal occasions, and also without forgetting that the “universal 
learner” or “mind” does not exist. The researcher can only meet real people (and not abstract 
representatives of a “growing mind”) who come along at a given moment in their life 
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trajectories (Zittoun, 2009), situated in time and space, with their past experiences and future 
perspectives. 
<H1>“Choose Two or Three Scapegoats and Make Your Point!”</H1> 
Piaget was not only teaching but also advising his students. I remember hearing him often 
give us this tip: “If you want to write a paper, choose two or three scapegoats and make your 
point!” There was something self-descriptive to this advice: Piaget was often introducing his 
own perspective as if it were a counterargument to a famous, previously mentioned author’s 
statement. Perhaps every philosopher and every scientist does this. But with Piaget, more than 
in any other of our classes, it drew us (in the role of listeners) systematically into century-long 
ongoing debates. It was not only stimulating but also overwhelming: at certain moments our 
awareness of the scarcity of our education and culture in these debates was growing; at other 
times we would retreat into a sort of admiration of our professor and then falsely conclude 
that the author just mentioned by Piaget was an isolated (!) thinker and that Piaget’s 
statements were completely (!) new. 
Why only two or three scapegoats? Why was Piaget using such a negative term 
(scapegoat) and inducing us into such an aggressive social relationship? Was he a social 
psychologist with a (strange) theory of the social construction of knowledge? No, in fact, he 
did not see much point in developing a social psychology of cognitive development (Perret-
Clermont, 2004, 2008). It seemed paradoxical to us that, in his theory, Piaget would grant so 
much importance to cooperation and reciprocity as a main dimension of rationale thinking 
and that now, in practical terms, the idea of cooperation would be replaced by some type of 
fight. Piaget was usually speaking of “inner cognitive conflicts”—and here he was presenting 
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himself as an efficient writer via a sort of punching game—obviously a social game! This 
puzzled me. Later, I had the opportunity to come back to this issue in various ways: through 
researching the impact of socio-cognitive conflicts on development (Doise et al., 1975, 1976; 
Perret-Clermont, 1976, 1980; Perret-Clermont and Carugati, 2001; Muller Mirza and Perret-
Clermont, 2009); when intrigued by the role of the audience in logical reasoning, as Grize 
describes it, in particular, when he distinguishes models and schematizations—the latter 
marked by the addressee and never detached from its initiator (Grize, 2005, p. 71); and when 
Rigotti introduced me to a renewed pragmatic and contextually situated understanding of the 
long tradition of thinking as an argumentative process among debaters of differing 
standpoints (Perret-Clermont, 2006; Rigotti and Greco Morasso, 2009; Rigotti and Rocci, 
2006). 
Still, why “scapegoats?” Is this not an attitude—and perhaps even a gender-biased 
attitude—that will scare off many students and citizens and turn them toward disliking 
argumentative reasoning and even thinking? Was Piaget not right (even if he seems to forget 
it when he talks of scapegoats) when he claimed that cooperation and reciprocity are 
important, as alternatives to competition, in fostering thinking, learning, and social relations? 
Fortunately, for those who dislike this idea of useful “adversaries,” even some research in 
neurosciences, much in line with our own experimental results in psychology (Perret-
Clermont, 1980), is providing evidence nowadays that social concern for equity can be 
rewarding and intellectually stimulating (Fehr et al., 2008). Yet it is tempting to follow the tip 
and make Piaget a scapegoat to forge one’s own thoughts and then present them as entirely 
new. I am sure the reader can find excellent examples of this in scientific literature. 
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As an adolescent in high school, I remember being surprised to hear a famous artist’s 
quote that he saw himself as “formed by the influence of others.” I was at the age of difficult 
self-assertion and could not immediately understand why this accomplished adult was 
claiming the importance of others in his personal growth and expression. Later, listening to 
Piaget’s advice about scapegoats, I wondered whose influence I should look for: that of being 
inevitably and thankfully formed (or shaped?) by others or that of self-assertion in a 
combative “scapegoat” mode? I disliked both. Why were the reported experiences of the artist 
and of Piaget so different? Were they contradictory? Nos esse quasi nanos gigantium humeris 
insidentes, ut possimus plura eis et remotiora videre4: this perspective—not a novelty in an 
educational perspective as it dates back to Bertrand of Chartres in the twelfth century and was 
an essential premise in the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Perret, 2011)—sounded safer. 
Hence, I resolved to consider Piaget in the position of the giant and to try to step on his 
shoulders and look beyond. I must confess that his shoulders were very high. But other 
authors and colleagues provided ladders. This climbing exercise created new openings: 
approaching another person’s perspective is always an experience of “otherness.” One of the 
consequences of approaching Piaget as a person was the need that I felt to “put him back” (so 
to speak) in his own sociocultural context, and this has inspired me to revisit the concrete 
Piaget growing and taking up his first scientific and professional duties in Neuchâtel (Perret-
Clermont and Barrelet, 2008). This helped me understand in which ongoing debates he 
developed his own thinking and what stands he took. I am now happy to ask my students 
which of these debates and stands they think are still relevant today in the present context. 
Mead (1934) considered how, during their lives, people experience different roles 
when they interact with others who are different and, as a result, interiorize this experience in 
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the form of a “generalized other.” But there is probably more to this. The “alterity” of another 
person cannot be reduced to the interiorized experience of having interacted with him or her. 
Although recognizing how much the “me” is (co)-organized by role-taking and social 
experience, I think that there is a kind of obligation toward a clearer distinction between 
“other” and “I.” This distinction is vital to experience the presence of the other person and for 
dialogue to exist. The encounter with the other, with an intention to respect his or her intimate 
uniqueness, is an individualizing experience for the self, and it creates an opening for the 
growth of the individual person (Levinas, 1947/1985). 
In the paragraphs above, the reader will have recognized how some of Piaget’s basic 
intellectual attitudes have been a source of inspiration for me, even if I was often far from 
agreeing with him. I will now allude, in an absolutely nonexhaustive way, to a few of Piaget’s 
ideas that I have consciously borrowed. 
<H1>Pushing Some of Piaget’s Ideas beyond Their Initial Meanings</H1> 
<H2>Children Are Not Miniature Adults: A Matter of Qualitative Changes</H2> 
The days in which Piaget became interested in psychology were those of the birth of 
pediatrics and the growing interest of Freud, Claparède, Montessori, Gesell, and others in 
understanding the specificity of the child’s body and of his5 developmental and educational 
needs. This was certainly at the root of one of Piaget’s basic premises that still seems relevant 
today: children are not miniature adults. They are not just quantitatively different from adults 
because of an eventual lack of experience, knowledge, or intelligence. Piaget used to compare 
the growth of the child’s intelligence to embryogenesis: just as the body of the fetus 
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undergoes major qualitative changes to become a baby, a child, an adolescent, and finally a 
full-grown adult, the child’s ways of reasoning are not just becoming more complex, 
powerful, and informed, they are undergoing major qualitative changes. 
Piaget tried to describe these qualitative changes in terms of “structures.” The 
observation of décalages (gaps between the acquisition of different notions within a given 
stage) and many critiques of the reductionism of this structural hypothesis have weakened it. 
Changes in children’s intelligence need not be reduced to logical structures nor explained in 
those terms. Yet it remains interesting to describe the coherence of a child’s reasoning within 
a set of relatively similar tasks and to observe how newly acquired understandings are 
transferred from one task to another. For instance, interesting processes become noticeable 
when care is put in verifying that the individual learning observed after certain peer 
interactions is of an operatory nature and not only mere conformity or lip service to what 
peers are saying (Perret-Clermont, 1976, 1980; Schwarz et al., 2008; Tartas et al., 2010). 
The interdigitation of social and cognitive components in the acquisition and use of 
qualitatively new operatory competence is a rich and open field of inquiry (Perret-Clermont 
and Carugati, 2001; Psaltis et al., 2009) with important implications for the design of 
curricula, as well as for learning and assessment methods (Schubauer-Leoni et al., 1989; 
Schubauer-Leoni and Perret-Clermont, 1997). 
It is not only the Piagetian autoequilibration process but also the social regulation of 
the unfolding conversation that affects, step by step, children’s states of mind and their 
reasoning, offering them opportunities to interiorize newly coconstructed operatory 
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competencies (Marro Clément, 1999; Marro Clément et al., 1999; Schwarz et al., 2008). 
Cognitive growth is not an addition of information nor a mere imitation or internalization. It 
is a coauthored constructive and interactive process (see Bronckart, this volume). 
<H2>From the Importance of Children’s Own Activity to How Learners Actively Construct 
Meaning</H2> 
As just suggested, it is heuristic to consider that children differ from adults in their 
approaches to tasks, but the Piagetian hypothesis that this is due to the inner logical 
“structure” of their minds is not sufficient and not always necessary: the meaning (in terms of 
goal, symbolic value, status, sense of the self, foreseen consequences, etc.) that children 
attribute to the activity is of primordial importance to the learning and developmental process 
(Bruner, 1990; Perret-Clermont and Bell, 1987; Perret-Clermont et al., 1991, 2004; Zittoun et 
al., 2006). Piaget was right in calling attention to the psychological need of the child to be 
active, to the importance of the child’s own previous experiences, and to the role of the child 
himself in reflecting upon his own actions in search of a feeling of mastery and understanding 
(Piaget, 1974). Although Piaget did mention it in one of his later writings (Piaget, 1972), he 
very rarely paid specific attention to the symbolic, social, and existential meaning of the 
activity or present situation for the child. The child’s activity, central to Piaget’s theory, had 
not been considered in all its dimensions: Piaget tended to reduce it to an epistemic activity. 
When children are active and creative, they are not only epistemic subjects motivated 
to think, reflect, and contribute to social coordination, as Piaget viewed them, but just as 
importantly, they are also experiencing the pleasure of existence (via acting, talking, thinking, 
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interacting, or producing) as well as threats to their existence (failures of their actions, neglect 
from adults, discrimination from peers, misinterpretations of their intentions, losing face, 
painful facts, etc.). Identity is at stake when a person is involved in an activity trying to give 
meaning to its positive and negative feedback or ruptures. We have tried to investigate which 
interpersonal relationships (Hinde et al., 1985; Perret-Clermont et al., 2004) and social frames 
(Grossen and Perret-Clermont, 1992; Perret-Clermont, 2001) foster learning and development 
and allow for the person’s active elaboration of her experience into meaningful resources for 
new situations (Bugnon et al., 2010; Perret-Clermont and Zittoun, 2002; Perret and Perret-
Clermont, 2011 in press; Zittoun, 2006a,b). 
<H2>The Child’s Own Activity: Let’s Not Forget That It Takes Place within or at the Border 
of Larger Collective Activities</H2> 
In learning settings, people are not only answering questions or performing, they are also 
trying thereby to meet their own goals. They are embedded in communication processes with 
the people who have set the task (with its frame, discourse genre, and instrumental resources) 
and who will evaluate their performances. The activity of the learner (most often the learner is 
a child, but it is also the case for adults) does not encompass only the expert’s definition of 
the task but also the participant’s own stakes in accepting to respond to these explicit and 
implicit expectations (Grossen and Perret-Clermont, 1994; Light and Perret-Clermont, 1989; 
Marro Clément and Perret-Clermont, 2000; Muller-Mirza and Perret-Clermont, 1999; Muller 
Mirza et al., 2003). 
14
The expectation that students should be invited to be active and autonomous in 
constructing the knowledge that they are supposed to learn in a given teaching setting can be 
paradoxical in many ways. Why would they? How could they come to reconstruct precisely 
the kind of knowledge that the teacher expects? Is there such a mechanism as a unique “line 
of development” that would determine (unconsciously) the direction in which the learner 
reconstructs the knowledge that she is supposed to acquire? We don’t think so. Activity 
theory is helpful here to understand that the learning setting is an activity setting, at the 
crossroads of other activity settings (pertaining to the family and social life, peer group or 
professional activities, etc.), with different role distributions, tools and symbolic mediations, 
goals, values, and norms. Even when some intersubjectivity between the participants of a 
teaching–learning setting seems to have been explicitly reached, it might still be the case that 
it partly relies on implicit misunderstandings due to the transfer of previous or parallel 
experiences from other activity settings (Bausch et al., 2007; Perret-Clermont, 2009; Perret-
Clermont et al., 2000). 
In studies in which activities designed to foster argumentation have been introduced 
into the classroom (Muller Mirza and Perret-Clermont, 2009; Perret-Clermont and Schwarz, 
2008), it is very interesting to observe how these activities solicit all sorts of psychological 
processes that hinder or foster reasoning (Arcidiacono and Perret-Clermont, 2010; Muller 
Mirza and Perret-Clermont, 2008; Muller Mirza et al., 2009). A dialogue, a critical 
discussion, the asking of a new question, or the accounting for one’s statements are all risky 
enterprises in which students do not venture without precaution. Social representations of 
gender (Psaltis, 2005; Psaltis and Duveen, 2006) and other social norms (Nicolet, 1995) affect 
their strategies. The school is an activity setting that is not independent of the other social 
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games in which children take part: they cross over boundaries and transfer meaning and 
learning in unexpected ways. 
<H1>Time Perspective</H1> 
To answer the question of how Piaget has influenced my research, I have tried here to 
describe the different lines of questioning that I have been following that are rooted in the 
Piagetian experience. But, more concisely, I see three main elements instigated by Piaget that 
will certainly continue to influence my work. 
The first element is the habit that I will certainly not lose of considering a 
psychological event in its time perspective and to expect this genetic perspective to inform me 
at the epistemological level. The past does not fully “explain” the present. The future is open: 
imagining that the present fully determines the future would mean forgetting the creative 
forces at stake. The present can be considered a “snapshot” of long biological and 
sociocultural processes, both at the individual and at the collective levels. As in other 
sciences, instead of just stopping on the image given by the snapshot (Latour, 1985, Latour 
and Weibel, 2002), observing this process permits an operative understanding of reality, of 
the sociopsychological construction of reality and of the means to account for it. Among other 
implications, this is very important for education because it is a future-oriented activity that 
builds on the past (the past of the experienced child coming into a new lesson; the past of the 
expert generatively identifying or not with the learner; and the past of the culture offering or 
imposing cultural artifacts as mediations for the actions and knowledge of the new 
generation). Time itself is also to be seen in a time perspective: the representations of past, 
present, and future are man-made in their conceptual as well as their technical and normative 
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dimensions (Perret-Clermont, 2005). These are closely connected to the specific activities in 
which these representations of time are elicited, including the scientific disciplines themselves 
(Royer et al., 2006). 
The role of the learner’s activity is the second element that will certainly remain 
central to my research. It will continue to be enriched by the perspective of activity theory and 
not limited to the internal processes of the mind or to the cognitive aspects. Cultural 
mediations, individual and collective goals and values, gender and socially marked role 
distributions are part of the settings in which individuals think and learn. Yet specific 
attention needs to be paid to those elements that make it possible for the individual to adapt 
“creatively to newness and to live with the fundamental fragility dependent on her interiority 
and her sense of integrity” (Zittoun and Perret-Clermont, 2009). 
The third element of Piaget’s legacy that will continue to inspire my research is the 
question of the possible interdependency between the modalities of relationship experienced 
in social interactions and the epistemic status of the knowledge thereby acquired (Piaget, 
1960). Learning itself has a micro-history: it is embedded in a time series of events and 
interpersonal exchanges (see Saada-Robert, this volume), often embedded within a 
conversation and under more or less explicit institutional constraints. As a result, the access to 
information, the possibility of testing the quality of this information—or even simply to feel, 
allowed to doubt and reason—will constrain the learner’s understanding. Moreover, the 
possibilities that the classroom will (or will not) offer the students a place to be creative will 
affect the scope of the whole teaching–learning activity: teaching can be just a matter of 
transferring established knowledge and skills, but just as importantly, if not more, learning 
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can also be the moment in which creative acts offer both learners and teachers opportunities 
to gain new insights, knowledge, and know-how (Engeström, 1987, 2008; Giglio and Perret-
Clermont, 2010). This understanding of learning rooted in the learner’s creative activity will 
probably lead us into a reconsideration of the traditional (false) dichotomy in vocational 
training between “theory” and “practice”: success and understanding are interdependent 
processes. They require adequate secure settings that can allow for doubts and trial and error: 
settings that sustain reflection on these moments by providing mediation, information, and 
support (Bugnon et al., 2009; Perret and Perret-Clermont, in press). 
Finally, it is the combination of these three elements that is central to our present 
interest in research on argumentation (Muller Mirza, 2009; Perret-Clermont et al., in 
preparation): a cognition can be considered as a provisional standpoint that is more or less 
explicit or implicit, conscious or not. It is the standpoint of an individual or of a group. It is 
usually the result of argumentative moves and it opens debates. A cognition becomes 
knowledge when it has successfully been submitted for discussion and checked by explicit 
procedures (such as scientific methodologies). If knowledge is just imposed on the learner, 
the learning will be at risk of being so superficial that it is not really knowledge that the 
learner has gained. If the knowledge offered is critically discussed by active learners, the 
learning will be deeper: the knowledge acquired will then be some kind of living memory of 
past and present debates, opening ways for the learners’ own understandings, thereby 
allowing them to reach the roots of their cognitive socialization (Bernstein, 1974) and shared 
common beliefs (endoxa) (Rigotti and Greco Morasso, 2009). This can happen in many fields 
and, in particular, in science education. 
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1. I am keeping the masculine form: masculine pronouns were the only ones used in those days.
2. In Search of Mind is the title of Bruner’s autobiography (Bruner, 1984). But I was so enthusiastic reading this
intellectual adventure that I keep thinking that its title is In Search of Meaning. 
Conceptualizing the distinction between meaning and understanding is something Piaget did not contribute much 
to. He can even be considered misleading when he explains the “meaning” of a child’s behavior in terms of its 
relevance to the logical structure of the stage. 
3. Born a few years later than Piaget, also from an established family in Neuchâtel and former student at the
University of Neuchâtel, Denis de Rougemont was also a nonconformist philosopher, and, in Geneva, the 
founder of the European Institute of Culture, an international institution dedicated to the promotion of 
intercultural dialogue, peace, and political science. 
4. “We are like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants, so that we can see more than they, and at a greater distance.”
5. I will keep using the masculine form for historical reasons and to avoid designating the child as “it.”
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